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Abstract - Among other proposals to reform the German out-
patient health care system the establishment of networks of
cooperating physicians (doctors’ networks) has found high and
controversial consideration in recent years. In this paper we
analyze doctors’ networks both from an economic perspective,
particularly with a view on network strategies, and the perspec-
tive of supporting information technologies. Our main conclu-
sions are that the viability of doctors’ networks critically de-
pends on trust-building mechanisms like the restriction of the
network in size and complexity and the application of fair profit
allocation rules. Concerning information technology the imple-
mentation and use of highly integrated interorganizational sys-
tems appears most promising. We propose an architecture of
such systems. It integrates information technology along the
medical, the business and the communication systems dimension
and serves as a vehicle for efficient use of shared patient data
and other network resources, knowledge creation, fair profit
allocation, improved business control and a high level of integri-
ty vis-a-vis the patient.
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM THE DOCTORS‘ ASSOCIATION TO
DOCTORS‘ NETWORKS
Because of its already very high and still increasing costs
the German health care system has been under heavy debate
during recent years. Solutions have been searched for that
maintain the current quality standard of medical treatment
while reducing costs or at least stopping their increase. The
actual health care system is embedded into a strong regulatory
framework which handles the relations between patients,
physicians, and insurance companies. About 90 percent of the
total population is covered by the system mainly because of
its statutory character for salaried employees up to a certain
income, but also becu e of comparative advantages for lar-
ger families [1]. The remaining part of the population is basi-
cally covered by private insurance schemes which are not
considered in this paper because of their relatively small rele-
vance to the overall problem.
Important parties of the regulatory framework are the „Kas-
senärztliche Vereinigung“, i.e. the association of the physi-
cians in outpatient health care, and the statutory health in-
surance companies which are admitted to the system. In the
following, we refer to these two  parties simply as “docto s‘
asociation“ and  “insurance companies“.  The  doctors‘ asso-
ciation has mainly two objectives: firstly to serve as a profes-
sional organization for the member physicians and to repre-
sent their interests in society, secondly to negotiate with the
insurance companies for a yearly amount of outpatient care
and redistribute this amount to the doctors proportionally to
oupatient services provided. Other than in the private in-
surance schem , in the statutory scheme the doctor does not
collect fees directly from the patient but is reimbursed by the
doctors‘ association. The patient may not even know the
volume and the specifics of the fee. Within the statutory sys-
tem, the doctors‘ association therefore serves as a clearing or-
ganization between physicians and insurance companies [2,
3].
With more and mo e financial constraints on the statutory
schem , the system exhibits some serious deficiencies. As the
total fin ci l vo ume for redistribution to the physicians is
fixed, the system invites for opportunistic behavior on the
doctors‘ side who try to get a share of the cake as large as
posible. This typically leads to hidden, but nevertheless
fierce competition between the physicians to increase the
volume of services provided, and jeopardizes the cost effi-
ciency of the system [4, 5].
Therefore, other solutions have been proposed. One of
these solutions is the voluntary establishment of „doctors‘
networks“. The fundamental idea of this proposal is o lower
regulatory forces and to introduce more market-like elements
into the health care system. In the doctors‘ network approach
several physicians from complementing disciplines establish a
relatively stable and long-term cooperation. A constitutional
element of a doctors’ network, hereby, is the joint treatment
of a patient by several legally independent network members
for a lump fee which has to be allocated to the treating physi-
cians by some network-internal mechanism. In this sense a
doctors’ network is quite distinct from and goes far beyond
other forms of cooperations between physicians which share
some information (e.g. quality circles) or some physical re-
sources (e.g. joint doctors’ offices) or from arrangements with
joint legal responsibility. The lump fees are negotiated bet-
ween the doctors’ network and the doctors’ association or
even directly with some or all of the statutory insurance com-
panies on a case-specific as well as a network-specific level.
By that, it is expected that the budget uncertainties in the
current system are reduced and activities are performed more
efficiently. Within the proposed scheme, the doctors’ asso-
ciation obviously does no longer play the role of a general
clearing organization. However, the association clearly sup-
ports the establishment of networks [6] and will still act as
clearing organization for all physicians not organized in net-
works. Within the doctors‘ network, one network member has
to assume the role of a coordinator and gatekeeper to the
patient, usually a general  practitioner (“family  doct r”).
In the meantime a few pilot networks have been under
operation  in  Germany [6]. Most known are the “Rendsburg
Initiative”, the project “Physicians in the Ried-Area”, and the
initiative “Quality and Humanity” [6]. Although the first re-
sults seem to indicate progress in cost efficiency it is too early
to draw firm conclusions from these experiments. Other expe-
riences with doctors’ networks like managed care in the
United States and in Switzerland are based on different social
and legal prerequisites and are not directly transferable to the
German situation [7].
While the doctors‘ network approach would reduce the
problem of opportunistic behavior in the current system, it
poses new problems. One is the potential rivalry between the
doctors within a given network that would transport the pro-
blem of opportunistic behavior only to another level. A
second question concerns the competition between networks
and the creation of competitive advantages of one network
against rival networks. Thirdly, and most importantly, the
network approach must be accepted by the patient, i.e. must
be more attractive than the current situation with individually
operating physicians. Attractiveness may be increa ed either
by superior medical service quality or by lower insurance
costs or by both. Besides political and legal influences the
solution to the three problems obviously depends on the dis-
tinct medical, economic, and social competencies of the net-
work. Besides many other factors, these competencies are
also impacted by the proper use of information technology in
a doctors‘ network. As we will argue, a common and highly
integrated information system constitutes an important strate-
gic resource that helps to add value to the services rendered to
the patient, to keep cost under control and to position the net-
work against rival newo ks.
The aim of our paper, therefore, is to evaluate and compare
the current and the proposed health care system both from an
economic and information technology (IT) perspective. In
chapter 2 we apply a framework for strategic planning in
networks, that we have developed for the analysis of different
types of networks in general, to the specific case in hand.
Chapter 3 deals with the role of IT in health care systems
more specifically, and proposes an overall architecture for an
interorganizational information system (IOS) in doctors‘ net-
works. Chapter 4 concludes the paper with a summary and
open questions for further analysis.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGIC  PLANNING
IN  NETWORKS
A. Strategic Framework
Strategic planning in networks has to cope with two inter-
dependent strategy levels: Collective network strategies and
firm-level network strategies [8]. Fig. 1 exhibits these two
levels in the specific context of doctors’ networks. The con-
ceptual distinction of the two levels expresses the coexistence
of competitive and cooperative elements in any network
arrangement.
Collective network
strategy
Strategic positioning of a
doctors‘ network against
external third part es
Interorganizational
strategic fit
Firm
boundaries
IOS Strategy
IT Strategy
Firm-level network
strategy
Strategic positioning of a
physician in a doctors‘
network
Fig. 1 Framework for strategic planning in networks.
Collective network strategies focus on positioning a net-
work as a whole relative to its environment, i.e. patients, rival
indiv dual doctors and doctors’ networks and the statutory in-
surance companies. They represent an extension of strategic
planning under conditions of joint strategic goals of the net-
work participants. The key focus of collective network strate-
gies is on realization of sustained coperative adva tages
with regard to costs, quality, timeliness, flexibility, and risk
sharing. As part of a collective network strategy, joint invest-
ment plans for IOS play an important role.
Firm-level network strategies, i.e. in our specific case the
strategies of each individual physician in a doctors’ network,
are inside oriented and concentrate on the positioning of each
member of the network vis-a-vis the other network members.
Firm-level strategies serve as a buffer between the network
perspective and the internal perspective and focus on the
alignment between collective network strategies and firm-
level functional strategies including the integral IT strategy of
the single physician.
B. Collective network strategies
The form lization of collective network strategies essen-
tially depen s on network size and network interdependen-
cies, see Fig. 2. Network size describes the number of mem-
bers of a network. Network interdependencies relate to the
distribution of bilateral links in the network. In the symmetric
case many network members interact with many other mem-
bers, either directly or via a joint activity such as a professi -
nal association. In the asymmetric case, there exist some
network members which have significantly more bilateral
links than others, like in buyer-supplier networks where some
buyers do business with several suppliers, and where little
interaction ccurs between the suppliers. In extremely asym-
metric constellations focal  firms  may  take  the  position of
an indispensable agent. If they are excluded from the arrange-
ment, the network will not produce any value at all. Asym-
metric networks exhibit substantial asymmetries in bargaining
power. Their economic performance strongly depends on the
provision of trust-building mechanisms. This argument is for-
maly developed in [8] by means of cooperativ  game theory.
Consistent with [8]four different strategic positions can be
identified within this framework: confederate collective stra-
tegy, conjugate collec ive strategy, emergent collective stra-
tegy, and the impossib lity to work out a formal collective
strategy because of the size and complexity of the underlying
network with highly asymmetric distribution of bargaining
power (no formal collective strategy).
In our specific case we concentrate on two particular net-
work types: the doctors’ association and the doctors’ network.
Their strategic position corresponds to the confederate col-
lective strategy and the conjugate colle tive strategy, respec-
tively, see Fig. 2.
Size of
network
Few
partners
Many
partners
Asymmetric Symmetric
Network interdependencies
No formal collective
 strategy
Confederate
collective strategy:
doctors’ association
Emergent collective
strategy
Conjugate collective
strategy:
doctors’ network
Fig. 2 Typology of collective network strategies.
Doctors’ associations are characterized by a large network
size as well as relatively symmetric network interdependen-
cies. Central objective of the underlying confederate collec-
tive strategy is to lower the direct competition between the
horizontally positioned physicians in certain domains. This
effect can actually be observed in the German health care sys-
tem where competition based on service as well as on prices
is almost non-existent [9, 10]. Yet, since the participating
doctors are either direct or indirect competitors the risk of
opportunistic behavior is inherent to the doctors’ association.
To mitigate the obvious conflicts between competit ve and
cooperative forces a high degree of formalization in inter-
organizational coordination mechanisms is necessary. In the
German health care system, the doctors’ association therefore
relies on relativ ly well-specified contracts and rules pre-
dominantly instiutionalized by legal regulations [10, 11].
Nevertheless, the underlying neoclassical contract types al-
ways  remain  partially  incomplete, in contrast to market con-
tr cts [12]. This ead  to  frequent  internal disputes about the
interpr ation of the existing regulations and requires the
docors’ association to mploy third parties for conflict reso-
lution and performance evaluation. Generally, the role of the
thi d party is represented by internal decision making units
within the doctors’ association. Also because of the competi-
tive bias  of  he doctors’ association, information exchange
beween the network members is coordinated through open
nd standardized information systems. Investments into inter-
organizational process integration, that would lead to unde-
sired lock-in effects, are unusual.
In contrast, the proposed doctors’ networks constitute rela-
tively small networks with dominantly asymmetric interorga-
nizational interdependencies. They essentially rely on gate-
keepers that take the role of network coordinators and repre-
sent the network as a whole against the external environment
(e.g. patients, the doctors’ association, or the insurance com-
panies). Typical tasks of gatekeepers are the negotiation of
case-specific or network-specific lump fees with the doctors’
association or directly with the insurance companies as well
as the routing of patients through the network. Gatekeepers
are usually represented by highly reputable general practitio-
ners that may also take the role of the network initiator and
composer. Obviously, because of the resulting information
asymmetries the general practitioner exhibits a dominant bar-
gaing position. Nevertheless, the participating physicians
are not direct competitors but possess complementary skills
and aim to cooperate on a stable and long-term basis. Because
of these characteristics a conjugate collective strategy seems
to be most suited. Other than with the confederate collective
strategy, the key focus is not so much on the pooling of com-
mon interests, but on the long-term viability of efficient sym-
biotic interorganizational relationships. Because of the long-
term pers ctive it is difficult to institutionalize collective
network strategies based on ex ante specified contracts and
rules. Instead, conjugate collective strategies aspire after
joint, periodically renegotiable service agreements. Further-
more, hey include common investment strategies, e.g. into
expensive medical chnologies, but also into proprietary and
highly in egrated IOS to gain sustainable competitive advan-
tages against rival networks. Conjugate collective network
strategies typic ly rely on implicit relational contracts [12,
8]. The objects of agreement usually are not verifiable by a
third party, though they may be observable by the partici-
pating network members. In consequence, the underlying
variabl s cannot be formalized in an ex ante comprehensive
contract and the applicability of network coordinators for
dispute resolut on and performance measurement is restricted.
Becau e of the incompleteness of contracts and the asymmet-
ric distribution of bargaining power conjugate collective stra-
tegies requi e trust-building mechanisms to ensure the long-
term viabil ty of the doctors’ network. These mechanisms are
related wi h the alignment strategies on the firm-level and will
be discu sed in more detail in chapter II.C.
Table I summarizes the main features of collective strat-
gies in the doctors’ association and the doctors’ network,
respectively.
TABLE  I
MAIN FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES
Main features
Doctors’
associat on
Doctors’
network
Degree of
formalization
Formal neoclassical
contracts
Implicit relational
contracts
Bargaining power
distribut on
Symmetric Asymmetric
Interorganizational
process integration
Low High
IOS type
Open /
standarized /
non-strategic
Proprietary /
integrated /
strategic
C. Firm-level network strategies
Firm-level network strategies comprise two dimensions:
Profit allocation strategies and interorganizational resource
strategies [8], see Fig. 3.
Profit
allocation
strategy
Competitive
orientation
Resource strategy 
Competitive network
strategy
Cooperative
network strategy:
doctors’ network
Competitive market
strategy
Consolidated
network strategy:
doctors’ association
Competitive
orientation
Cooperative
orientation
Cooperative
orientation
Fig. 3 Typology of firm-level network strategies.
Profit allocation strategies are concerned with the sharing
of revenues, investments, and costs and depend on the strate-
gically motivated application of bargaining power. “Com-
petitive profit allocation strategies” are characterized by a full
exploitation of bargaining power. Firms appropriate rents
according to their relative threat potentials determined by  the
expected network profits in comparison to anticipated profits
from alternative arrangements adjusted for switching costs
[13, 8]. In contrast, “cooperative profit allocation straegies”
institutionalize voluntary constraints in order to limit the po-
tentials of bargaining power exploitation. For example, such
constraints can be incorporated by the ex ante implementation
of fair profit alloca ion rules including fair sharing of joint in-
vestmen s or by the ex ante restriction of the network size.
The resource strategy focuses on the management of re-
source positions in interorganizational arrangements. Engage-
ment in networks constitutes a complementary strategy to the
concentration on core competencies and can be viewed from a
cooperative as well as from a competitive perspective [14, 8].
“Cooperative resource strategies” focus on the pooling or re-
ciprocal sharing of core competencies and resources in net-
works whereas “competitive resource strategies” strictly em-
phasize the protection of core competencies and resources.
Based on the cross comparison along the cooperative re-
spectively competitive orientation of the two strategic dimen-
sions four distinctive categories of firm-level  network strate-
gies can be distinguished:  Consolidated  network  strategy,
cooperative network  strategy, competitive network  strategy,
and competitive market strategy [8], see Fig. 3.
Physicians participating in a doctors’ association are
characterized by “consolidated network strategies” that are in
alignment with confederate strategies on the collective net-
work  level.  Consolidated  network  strategies  are  based on
a mix of competitive profit allocation strategies and coopera-
tive resource strategies on the firm level. Doctors’ associa-
tions focus on the pooling and joint utilization of similar re-
sources, particularly on data aggregation and fee settlement.
But because of the competitive nature of the arrangement
other information exchange is usually restricted to distinct
domains of interorganizational collaboration. Furthermore,
the inherent compe itive elements induce low incentives for
joint investments into integrated IOS. More generally, be-
cause of the well-specified contracts and the low degree of in-
terorganizational process integration non-contractible joi t in-
vestments are of minor relevance [15] and voluntary con-
straints in order to limit exploitation of bargaining power are
not required. Consequently, for  the doctors’ association
trust-building mecha is s play a less important role.
In contrast, physicians participating in a doctors’ network
can benefit from a mix of cooperative resource strategies and
cooperative profit allocation strategies. The underlying “co-
operative network strategy” on the firm-level matches with
conjugate strategies on the collective network level. Recipro-
cal sharing of medical core competencies and patient infor-
mation hand in hand with joint investment into medical tech-
nology or integrated IOS constitute central objectives of a
doctors’ network. Chapter III will discuss the aspect of IOS in
some detail. Furthermore, the creation and nurturing of social
and managerial network competencies including the ability to
develop trust, to share risk and to enhance collective learning
are of central importance. Typically, a key strategic asset in
doctors’ networks stems also from the high degree of inter-
organizational process integration. The productivity of an
indiv dual doctor in the network and the investment incen-
tives of the other network members are reciprocally depen-
dent. As a consequence, cooperative profit allocation strate-
gies to strengthen mutual trust and investment incentives are
critical for the long-term viability of doctors’ networks. Trust
building requires a renunciation of bargaining power exploita-
tion by dominant network members, particularly on the side
of  the gatekeeper. The  restriction  of  overlapping competen-
cies in doctors’ networks hand in hand with the ex ante limita-
tion of the network size constitute important trust-building
mechanisms. If asymmetric bargaining  power s exploited or
merely preserved, the weaker partn rs tend to underinvest and
the resulting economic position is worse for all actors in the
network [16].
Table II summarizes the main features of firm-level net-
work strategies in the doctors’ association and the doctors’
network.
TABLE  II
MAIN FEATURES OF FIRM-LEVEL NETWORK STRATEGIES
Main features
Doctors’
association
Doctors’
network
Trust Not required Imperative
Profit allocation
strategy
Exploitation of bargaing
power, if existent
Voluntary
constraints
Investment ince-
tives into IOS
Low High
“Competitive market strategies” and “competitive network
strategies” on the firm level in Fig. 3 match with the catego-
ries “no formal collective strategy” respectively “emerg nt
collective strategy” on the network level in Fig. 2. “Competi-
tive market strategies” typically prevail in large and complex
interorganizational relationships, whereas “competitive net-
work strategies” are especially suited for networks cooperat-
ing on a temporary basis [8].
In our medical context competitive market strategies would
be the result of large and highly interrelated doctors’ net-
works where some physicians participate permanently in
more than one network. It is almost impossible to establish
and control trust-building mechanisms in such complex ar-
rangements with highly asymmetric distribution of bargaining
power. This may be the reason why some of the managed care
systems in the United States make use of employed rather
than independent physicians. Within a hierarchy opportunistic
behavior can be much better kept under control.
Competitive network strategies apply to physicians who do
not cooperate within the network on a permanent base, par-
ticularly to highly specialized physicians whose services are
purchased by a doctors‘ network on demand. Since there are
no incentives for resource sharing in this case, we also would
not assume joint investments into highly integrated IOS.
With the emphasis on trust-building mechanisms, on a high
degree of IOS integration and on the creation of a network-
specific knowledge base, doctors’ networks stand in sharp
contrast to other forms of cooperative doctors’ arrangements.
They substantially differ from quality circles and joint doc-
tors’ offices that primarily focus on the pooling of information
respectively physical resources, but not on the integration of
the core competencies of the network members.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE  I  STRATEGY OF DOCTORS’
NETWORKS
A. Knowledge Creation and IT
In the current German health care system competition bet-
ween  the  physicians is reduced to a few parameters. There is
no competition with regard to service and price, because the
regulated fee order prescribes identi al prices for comparable
services [10, 11]. Since explicit advertisement is also not per-
mited [9], competition is basically geared towards increasing
a physician’s pool of patients through interpersonal recom-
mendation.
Besides professional reputation of a physician, there exists
one second essential competitive asset, namely knowledge
about the pai nt and his or her treatment. This knowledge re-
sides not only in explicit patient records, but also in implicit
or “tacit” knowledge about each individual diagnostic and
therapeutic case. Tacit knowledge cannot be codified and
therefore also not transferred to other physicians except if
they work very closely together. Here we see an immense
source of enduring competitive advantage for doctors’ net-
works. In tightly coupled and stable networks, learning as the
result of the interaction between explicit and tacit knowledge
[17] can be far more effective than individual learning or
learning in short-term arrangements. We have pointed out in
the last paragraph, that sharing of knowledge and collective
learning are key characteristics of the cooperative network
strategy which prevails in doctors’ networks. Because of its
limited transferability, this knowledge base constitutes a bar-
rier for patients to move to other networks or physicians out-
side the network, even if explicit medical records would be
transferred.
Because of the tacit component, knowledge in a doctors’
network cannot be represented by electronic patient records,
IT-based applications and databases as such. Yet, IT can
significantly enhance the knowledge creation process even on
the tacit level [18]. In addition, IT can also help to improve
the economic efficiency of a doctors’ network. In the follow-
ing we propose an architecture for an integrated and IT-based
interorganizational system (IOS)  for doctors’ networks which
supports both the knowledge creation process as well as the
search of economic efficiency.
B. Architecture of an Integrated IOS in a Doctors’ Ne-
work
Fig. 4 gives an overview of the architecture for the IOS. It
is characterized by stepwise system integration along three
dimensions: integration of the medical system, integration of
the business system and integration of the communication
system.
Medical 
system
Business system
Communication system
Case history data
Diagnosis and
therapy data
Medical images
Knowledge-
based systems
Service and
fee data
Accounting
system
Business control
 system
Advanced
communication
technologies
Administrative
data
Structured 
medical data
Application
sharing
Secure intranet
Fig. 4. Architecture of an integrated IOS.
The core and starting point for each dimension of integra-
tion is a shared database with administrative data, e.g. general
patient data or general data of the participating physicians in-
cluding specific competencies and installed medical techno-
logies. This administrative data base is shared by all other
applications along the three dimensions of integration.
Along  the dimension of integration for the medical system
we successively add to the administrative data the treatment-
specific patient data including laboratory measurements,
images produced by roentgen, acoustic, tomographic or nu-
clear technologies, data about initial findings, formal diagno-
sis and therapy, medical case history, and applications of
knowledge-based systems which support the physician in
diagnosis and therapy. Although the intensively discussed
medical expert systems have not found wide appreciation in
practice there exists a promising application potential for
intelligent checklists or for the use of case-based reasoning in
comparing an actual diagnostic or therapeutic case with pre-
vious cases of other patients [19]. However, unstructured
elements in the electronic patient record (e.g. dictated or
written reports) raise several problems in data communica-
tion, data management and data administration. Therefore,
meta-data technologies that address the management of large
bodies of text and facilitate the discovery and interconnection
of similar medical cases play an important role [20]. The
extraction of case history data represents a task far beyond the
capability of administrative database systems. This implie  to
build up an extensive and formalized case history which cer-
tainly would constitute a major competitive advantage of a
doctors’ network.
The integration along the dimension of the business system
starts with the compilation of network-specific lists for avail-
able services and fees. This module may also include an ac-
cepted algorithm for redistribution of fees between different
service providers  the network and the calculation of the
overall remuneration for each physician. A common account-
g system as a ext step of integration would contain all im-
portant busin ss data like investments into medical, office or
information technology, sala ies, material costs, and purcha-
se from services outside the network. The accounting system
will ultimately serve as the basis for a business control system
which provides and compares various indicators to measure
the economic fficiency of the network. Latest at this point
the business system should be also linked to the medical sys-
tem to allow for cost comparisons by disease and treatment
categories.
The integrat on alo g the dimension of the communication
system starts with the provision of a secure intranet. Because
of the sensibility of patient data strict measures of system
security have t  be taken. This comprises the control of
access rights (which are basically at the patient’s side and
hav  to be verified by the patient) and the secure encryption
of data, p eferably al ady in the database but in any case
when passing through public networks. Application sharing
al ow several physicians to share the same application. This
is par icularly important for the update and retrieval of patient
data, but also for most of the other applications in the IOS.
Architecture-indepe d nt Java applets coupled with markup
languages (SGML and its subset XML) represent cost effi-
ci nt options to work simultaneously at different locations
with one set of data and applications [20]. Advanced commu-
nication techn logies su h as video-conferencing improve the
real time communication between the doctors in the network.
The use of Email and the World Wide Web on the Internet
may serve as a platform for  effective  communication also
with the patients.
 The IOS components in Fig. 4 are certainly far from being
complet  and should only give some important directions of
integration. At the very end, the objective of the IOS is to
present the network to the patients and to the participating
physicians as one entity rather than a collection of services
from different sources.
A high degree of IOS integration along the medical, bus-
ness, and communication dimensions surely is a necessary
prerequisite for knowledge creation in tightly coupled doc-
tors’ networks, but by itself it is not a sufficient condition. So-
cial and managerial network competencies including capabili-
ties for conflict resolution and trust building represent further
flanking mechanisms for the efficient creation of a knowledge
base in doctors' networks.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Within this paper we have analyzed the transition from the
current system of outpatient health care in Germany to a sys-
tem which supports a stronger cooperation between physi-
cians in ambulant medicine. The analysis comprised aspects
of economics and of information technology.
On the economics side we have identified doctors’ net-
works as organizations of the conjugate network strategy
type. This implies that doctors’ networks are based on im-
plicit relational contracts and are exposed to bargaining
power asymmetries and as a consequence to problems of dis-
trust. To ensure long-term viability of the network trust-
building mechanisms have to be established. These mecha-
nisms include the restriction of the size and complexity of the
network as well as fair rules for fee, investment, and cost
allocation. The restriction in size contradicts with often heard
proposals to establish larger networks because of inherent
economies of scale. It also contradicts with the configuration
of the current pilot networks in Germany which seem to be
quite large [6]. Furthermore, the pilot networks seem to in-
volve overlapping competencies of the participating physi-
cians [6], a central inhibito  of trust building in network ar-
rangements. The restriction in size and complexity finally
puts a limit to the interaction between networks, and particu-
larly to the permanent presence of some physicians in more
than one network. The experiences in the United States
indicate that large and complex networks should rather be
operated by employed physicians, a solution which certainly
is not favored by the German health care system.
Concerning interorganizational information technology we
have voted for several reasons for a highly integrated solu-
tion. One reason stems from the long-term nature of the co-
operation and the importance of trust. The second reason re-
lates to the sharing of common resources as one important
objective of doctors’ networks. Integrated IOS make this
sharing more efficient. Another reason is the creation of a
knowledge base. A fourth reason, finally, concerns the pa-
tient. Only a strong and highly integrated IOS provides the
integrity (or to use the iridescent term “virtuality”) to the
patient  in  the  sense  that  he or  she has the impression to be
treated by a well-organized and  well-informed medical entity
rather than by a collectio  of more or less independent physi-
cians.
Our analysis leaves a series of questions open. One is the
coexistence of individ al physicians and physicians organ zed
in networks. Anoth r open question concerns the cooperation
between doctors’ n tworks, hospitals, and highly specialized
physicians. Also cooperative arrangem ts betwe n doctors’
network a d insurance companies constitute a topic for fur-
ther investigation. Some legal aspects were touched only very
briefly, particularly the sensitive question of patient data
protection. Much research in these areas is still needed. The
objective of our paper was to highlight some aspects relating
to the importance of trust building in doctors’ networks in
general and as a consequence to the relevance of proper size
and complexity of the networks and of the development and
use of integrated IOS.
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